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ISSUE BRIEF

THE WAR ECONOMY IN DARFUR

Distorting trade and fuelling conflict

SPARC

Introduction

This brief explores how trade is fuelling conflict through the war economy, with a focus on Darfur, Sudan. The first part describes the intertwined political and economic interests of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its leaders in Darfur; this has a long history and is critical to understanding the war economy in Darfur today (see Box 1 for definition). The second part describes how the RSF provides preferential access to traders from its own constituencies. The depth and prevalence of both of these aspects has major consequences for long-term established traders in Darfur.

The brief's overall purpose is to explain and analyse these dynamics in order to inform conflict-sensitive, market-oriented humanitarian programming. Since the RSF now controls most of the Darfur region – except for the city of El Fasher and a few enclaves in the far northwest – its involvement in the war economy emerges as a central theme. However, the RSF is not alone in this: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its allies are also deeply involved in war economy practices, particularly in areas outside Darfur (Abushama et al., 2023).

The brief also documents some other forms of malpractice, such as banditry and looting, that hinder the normal functioning of the market economy in Darfur. This distortion of Darfur's markets effectively victimises the majority of the population and threatens their well-being.

The analysis is based on first-hand accounts and predominantly qualitative data collected by researchers in each of Darfur's states for the period November 2024 to July 2025, as part of the project, *Understanding markets and trade in a context of extreme conflict and humanitarian crisis, with limited access, in Darfur, Sudan* (see Box 2). Additional information was gathered by interviewing key informants, including traders and academics based in Cairo, as well as a review of recent and relevant documentation.

Groundnuts are one of Darfur's major cash crops. Trade in groundnuts is now part of the war economy © Albert González Farran/UNAMID

BOX 1. DEFINING A WAR ECONOMY

The classic definition of a war economy is a set of contingencies undertaken by a state to mobilise its economy for war production (Galbraith, 2001). In protracted conflicts and civil wars, the term is often used to describe the illicit trade in resources (such as gold) by the military, militias or 'conflict entrepreneurs', that funds the conflict or civil war (Le Billon, 2000). This dimension has also been called the non-state or subaltern war economy (De Waal, 2025). There is also the 'shadow economy' or parallel economy which may not directly fuel the conflict but is operating on its margins where there is little regulation (Collinson, 2002).

In exploring the relationship between trade and conflict in Darfur, this brief focuses predominantly on the non-state war economy and on aspects of the shadow economy rather than the classic definition of the war economy.

BOX 2. SUMMARY OF THE UNDERSTANDING MARKETS PROJECT

This briefing note is part of a 12-month SPARC project, *Understanding markets and trade in a context of extreme conflict and humanitarian crisis, with limited access, in Darfur, Sudan*. It seeks to address three research questions:

1. How can market monitoring and data collection be adapted, using flexibility and sensitivity, to at least partially fill the information gap in Darfur – a context of extreme conflict, insecurity and constrained access – through local actors?

2. How has trade in agricultural and livestock commodities adapted, positively and negatively, to the current context of extreme conflict in Darfur, how is trade affecting the conflict, and what are the implications for social cohesion and for conflict-sensitive programming by humanitarian actors?

3. How can a deeper understanding of markets and trade in food commodities contribute to improved understanding of the severity of food insecurity in Darfur?

History of pre-war RSF engagement in trade and economic exploitation

Conflict in Sudan is deeply tied to rent-seeking practices, whereby political elites – especially under the former President Omar El Bashir – exploited economic resources, such as oil, gold, gum arabic, livestock and oilseeds, for personal gain and power consolidation. This period marked the peak of elite collusion, with the military dominating the economy through corrupt practices such as resource monopolisation, tax evasion and favouritism in public contracts.

RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as 'Hemedti', was already a camel trader before he rose to prominence as commander of a newly formed paramilitary group in 2013, under the aegis of the government of President El Bashir. The RSF effectively replaced the Border Guard Forces (BGF) led by Musa Hilal. Musa Hilal had earned the term *Janjaweed* for his militia forces that emerged during the Darfur conflict from 2003, and who were predominantly and initially formed of ethnic Arab pastoralists. Hemedti was a member of the *Janjaweed* working under Musa Hilal. When President El Bashir decided to get rid of Musa Hilal because of disagreement, he chose Hemedti to lead the new group and merged the BGF into the RSF. The ascendancy of Hemedti to this position was associated with his control of the famous Jebel Amir gold mine in North Darfur and the subsequent arrest of Musa Hilal, who had incidentally controlled the mine before Hemedti did.

Hemedti was later rewarded with a concession to operate more gold mines in Songo in South Darfur and North Kordofan. This followed the defeat by his forces with the SAF, of the forces of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the battle of Goz Dango, South Darfur in April 2015.

Hemedti subsequently established a family-run business empire by registering companies under the names of close relatives. These companies today operate across a wide range of sectors – including gold mining, livestock, groundnuts, technology and even banking – cementing his economic influence alongside his military power. Al-Junaid company is registered in Sudan under the name of Hemedti's brother, 'Abdulrahim', who also acts as his deputy in the RSF leadership.

GSK – a small technology and security company based in Sudan – and Tradive General Trading LLC, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are both controlled by one of Hemedti's younger brothers, 'Algoni' (Global Witness, 2025). The RSF itself has been reported to own an account in the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (now part of First Abu Dhabi Bank). Reports showing money funnelling between this RSF account and Hemedti's family companies indicate the close financial links, and indeed the very close association of the RSF, with the business interests of the Dagalo family (Global Witness, 2025).

Having amassed vast wealth through mining, trade, and recruitment of young Sudanese men as mercenaries for the Saudi-Emirati coalition in Yemen, Hemedti began to develop a strong appetite for political power. This trajectory ultimately led to his appointment as deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council in the transitional government formed after the ousting of President El Bashir. Al-Burhan strengthened the power of the RSF by amending the RSF Law, granting its commander the authority to report directly to the Head of the State.[1] Hemedti later negotiated a deal to withdraw from the Jebel Amir gold mine in exchange for a very substantial sum to be paid by the transitional government led by Prime Minister Hamdok. One source quotes this as being US$50 million (Aljazeera, 2025), another, US$250 million (Soliman and Baldo, 2025).

This arrangement effectively redirected a significant revenue stream – originally generated from the Jebel Amir gold mine – to the Sudanese government. This then became a financial source potentially supporting RSF operations or other undisclosed investments. Following this deal, the RSF began openly using these funds to consolidate power, notably through the strategic co-option of tribal and communal leaders. Simultaneously, the group expanded its commercial networks both within Sudan and across borders, further embedding itself in regional trade and patronage systems.

RSF engagement in trade since the war broke out

When the current war broke out in April 2023, the RSF swiftly gained full control of four of Darfur's five states (apart from North Darfur). It established what it refers to as a 'civil administration' to assume the functions of regular governance and service provision for the population. Meanwhile, the outbreak of war in central Sudan – particularly in Khartoum and Gezira – was marked by widespread looting of a vast range of assets, including personal property of all kinds: cash, gold, cars, trucks, machinery and electrical appliances.

The 'Dagalo markets' – where goods stolen and looted by RSF soldiers and thieves are sold – soon became famous across the country. Sellers and buyers of used and new (usually stolen from stores and shops) appliances and furniture would gather in a large open ground usually outside residential neighbourhoods to hold informal markets where these transactions took place regularly.

In many instances, sellers established fixed stalls or enclosures to store their goods, driven by the absence of formal regulatory bodies overseeing the sale of used appliances and furniture. Although commonly referred to as 'Dagalo markets', these venues attracted not only RSF affiliates but also individuals unaffiliated with the RSF but already engaged in illicit trade, either because of prior criminal involvement or out of economic necessity.

Consequently, the arrival of truckloads of goods pillaged from central Sudan into Darfur and Kordofan became a noticeable phenomenon. Under the prevailing security conditions, only RSF-related persons can transport or trade such goods. They can be soldiers acting on their own, relatives, friends or tribal members and collaborators connected with RSF commanders who expect preferential treatment in terms of relaxation in applying established rules.

As one of the strongholds of the Rizaigat tribe to which Hemedti belongs, the capital of East Darfur State, Ed Daein witnessed extensive activities of this type. In Al Geneina, the capital city of West Darfur State, RSF-related traders also largely control trading. Old-time traders from non-Arab ethnicities had fled the town in the aftermath of the killing of the previous governor Khamis Abbaker (who belonged to the Masalit group) in June 2023, and the subsequent and brutal violence against the group by the RSF.

Since the war began the RSF has hugely expanded its commercial activities in the sectors previously operated by Al-Junaid and other Dagalo family companies. It has also grown into new areas. Reports from researchers in Darfur indicate that dealing in gold production from mines in Darfur and Kordofan continues and is exported via South Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. Gum arabic, a strategic commodity for which the Sudan is a leading producer, especially in Kordofan and Darfur, has long been smuggled through Chad. However, following the RSF's takeover, long-standing traders in this lucrative sector were forcibly displaced and replaced by the RSF. Groundnuts are another key cash crop for which East Darfur is particularly renowned. Because of the RSF's monopolisation of this trade many long-term groundnut traders have fled the country for the safety of themselves and their families, according to information provided to the research team in Cairo by traders from Darfur.

This is also true for sesame, another important oilseed traded alongside groundnuts. Researchers within Darfur report that long-time traders in the oilseed sector in East Darfur who did not leave have changed their operations, engaging in production instead, to supply the RSF traders who now have a complete monopoly of trade in this sector.

1 Al-Burhan issued decree No. 34 (July 30, 2019) that revoked Article 5 of the 2017 law that subjected the RSF to the SAF Act. This essentially removed any legal requirement for the RSF to be under the control of the regular military or any future civilian government.

The Dagalo family businesses, and by extension the RSF, used to export livestock (camels, cattle and sheep) directly to Egypt, and also to Saudi Arabia and the UAE via Port Sudan. These direct routes are no longer possible because the east of Sudan is under the control of SAF, and the livestock trade between Sudan and Egypt now favours companies associated with SAF. This is also one of the reasons why the RSF imposed a trade embargo on the movement of goods out of Darfur and Kordofan. Nevertheless, due to the lucrative nature of livestock trading, the Dagalo family businesses and some RSF affiliates are still able to export livestock from Darfur, mainly to Chad, Libya and Egypt through complex routes and arrangements, as reported in the brief on long-distance trade (SPARC, 2025).

Reports from Darfur also show the engagement of RSF companies and senior officers in acquiring land and housing plots in urban areas, especially in state capitals (Ed Daein, Nyala, Zalingei and Al Geneina). Engagement in real estate business is not new for the RSF which used to operate in this sector in the pre-war period, especially in Khartoum, although its activities in Darfur at that time were limited. They have now begun importing building and construction materials via Chad and South Sudan, becoming the only major operators in this sector in Darfur.

Meanwhile, trade in illicit commodities such as narcotics and spirits appears to be increasing due to a lack of regulation by the RSF in Darfur and de facto open borders between it and neighbouring countries. East and West Darfur States are the main entry points for such imports. Synthetic/manufactured drugs are brought from Chad while spirits come from Chad and South Sudan. South Darfur is known for the local production of the narcotic plant, 'hashish', in the Radom area, near the gold mining sites.

Although the RSF leadership has officially declared a campaign against drugs, its soldiers have been known from before the war to transport such commodities in their vehicles because they are not subject to regular investigation at checkpoints.[2] Now that the RSF is controlling the whole region, communities in Darfur are suffering even more from the spread of imported and locally produced narcotics, which is destroying the productive capacities of youth. The association of drugs with conflict and paramilitary groups is widely known around the world. In Darfur, recent reports claim that some local drug dealers have even joined the RSF to seek cover for their activities (Darfur24, 28 January 2025).

On the import side, the Dagalo/RSF companies are mostly dominating commodities in high demand in Darfur: mainly fuel and wheat flour from Libya. Traders in Ed Daein also import manufactured goods (food items and electrical equipment) from Dubai via Kenya and South Sudan. On the other hand, the RSF and RSF-aligned traders are less involved in commercial activities concerning locally produced grain (millet and sorghum) as well as fruits and vegetables. This is because these sectors are historically dominated by traders from non-Arab farming communities. However, many RSF soldiers and associates do make money from transportation in these sectors.

War has created conditions in which the performance of normal state institutions governing public life has been seriously compromised. As a result, all kinds of malpractice regarding governance of public and individual property have proliferated. The absence of the rule of law and a lack of transparency have contributed hugely to the development of a shadow economy (see Box 1 for definition). This has plagued Sudan as a whole, and Darfur in particular. By controlling the economy of the region and condoning the malpractice of its personnel and those aligned to it, the RSF has enabled different aspects of the non-state war economy to prevail in Darfur today.

Preferential access to trade to those connected to the RSF, and corruption

New entrants to the market associated with the RSF

As well as the Dagalo family businesses closely associated with the RSF that are at the heart of the war economy in Darfur, there is a wider and growing group of RSF-aligned traders. This is a heterogeneous group, primarily drawn from Arab ethnic communities, alongside a smaller number of individuals from non-Arab backgrounds who were co-opted during the RSF's territorial and political expansion following the fall of El Bashir.

While the official RSF narrative emphasises ethnic inclusivity – claiming support from across Sudan's diverse communities – its internal practices continue to reflect a pattern of preferential treatment that disproportionately benefits groups of Arab ethnicities.

These new RSF-aligned traders have access to capital and transportation, but most have no trading experience nor trading networks with other long-term and established traders. The source of their capital which has appeared so suddenly is unknown to local communities who are thus suspicious of them and cautious about establishing trading relations with them. Stories circulate about capital originating from looted property or financing by senior RSF officers. In addition, the traders can depend on the use of RSF vehicles operated by junior-ranking individuals working for themselves, and benefit from preferential security passes for vehicles carrying their goods.

2 This has been endemic across the security apparatus in Sudan for years (Abushama et al., 2023).

To compensate for their lack of experience, these new traders often form alliances with established merchants, offering them access to credit and preferential treatment in the payment of taxes and other levies, and leveraging connections with security personnel to facilitate the transport of their commodities. Some of the bona fide long-term traders engage, frequently because of a lack of alternative options, while some refrain because of fear of stigmatisation, and the risks of such a one-sided power relationship in which trust has no place. This section outlines the ways in which these new entrants are receiving preferential treatment.

Meanwhile, many traders from long-established mercantile families in Darfur have ceased their commercial activities. Historically, trade had been very much based on deep relationships and established networks between traders, which has in turn facilitated sales on the basis of credit and deferred payments, based on trust, as a social institution, including over long distances. This is no longer possible in the current conflict environment.

A significant change in trader profiles has also been reported by researchers who are closely observing the markets in state capitals in Darfur. More than 90% of traders in Al Geneina market are reported to be from the RSF or are RSF-aligned, rising to almost 100% in the gold and fuel-trading sectors. In Zalingei, they make up an estimated 40% of traders, mostly engaged in groundnut trading. Meanwhile, in Nyala, the RSF or RSF-aligned traders represent only about 20% of all traders (except in the livestock sector where they represent about 90%) and have done since the beginning of the current war. The replacement of traditional traders is a particular trend in wholesale trading which is where most of the newcomers (RSF-aligned traders) try to place themselves.

Some of them in Nyala have resorted to making credit offers to long-established retail traders to develop new networks. But many have reservations about dealing with the newcomers, for reasons described above. In East Darfur it has been observed that some of the new RSF-aligned traders, lacking the necessary knowledge, are turning to educated people in Ed Daein to support them.

Other forms of corrupt practices have also been repeatedly reported in media sources.[3]

Relocation and closure of markets

Where there is money to be made in big and busy markets, the RSF has shown an aptitude for raising revenue by relocating all or parts of a given market, from which they can benefit by issuing new market fees. This also provides the opportunity for RSF-aligned traders to obtain strategic locations in the market. Such favouritism means the RSF can ensure maximum gains for their own cliques.

In Nyala, for example, the relocation from Geneina station market (through the destruction and dispossession of old shops) to old Nyala market was an opportunity for the RSF to raise fees and reallocate market spaces to traders who could pay higher amounts. The process favoured new traders and eliminated old established traders. Another market in Nyala, Gadra market, was permanently closed due to the frequent eruption of violent conflict in the market that claimed lives.

Again, such decisions meant RSF-aligned traders receiving preferential treatment. When the RSF took control of Dar AlSalaam locality in North Darfur, they forced the closure of markets (in early April 2025) to bolster their control of goods flowing into besieged El Fasher. The bigger, more established traders have already left since the war began .

Taxation and levies

In general, the RSF authorities did not create new institutions, rather they took over existing government bodies already mired in inefficiency and corruption, and in some cases manipulated them further. Tax collection is one example, and an important area for preferential treatment of RSF-aligned traders who may be exempt or pay reduced taxes and levies since assessment methods are mostly subject to personal whim and patronage.

Local researchers report that in Al Geneina and Nyala tax collectors in the market have been reshuffled to include more employees from Arab groups. This is a clear indication of preferential treatment, given the fact that collectors keep some of the money for themselves. In addition to collecting normal taxes stipulated by the Ministry of Finance, they now take additional charges for security personnel who are supposed to guard the market. However, traders are not confident of the effectiveness of the market guards, many of whom are untrained new faces who may even engage in breaking into shops at night. For this reason, many traders keep their merchandise at home or in places away from the market to avoid night thieves.

The RSF is not alone in raising taxes related to the war effort. In Ed Debba, a trading hub in Northern State that has replaced Omdurman since the war began, new levies are introduced to help fund war efforts for the SAF. A

3 In a further example of corruption, a story has been circulating on social media since July about a company in Al Geneina (capital of West Darfur) recently set up by a man who is the head of the RSF-appointed 'civil administration' and that he then went on to collect SDG20 billion (US$5.7 million) from citizens with a promise of a return on their 'investment', and then disappeared. Darfur24 Electronic Newspaper, 24 July 2025. 'A trading company defrauded traders of approximately 20 trillion pounds in West Darfur' (https://www.darfur24.com/2025/07/24/).

document recently circulated on social media, carrying the name and stamp of the 'The Higher Committee for Mobilization and Resistance' in Ed Debba locality, establishes new levies to be collected for the benefit of the committee according to a table showing the specified amount for each type of vehicle entering the locality boundaries. The highest figure of SDG500,000 (about US$200) is specified for a 60-tonne truck, the type that is used for transporting goods to Darfur. Such levies are collected by the Chamber of Commerce on behalf of the SAF. Again, corruption in reporting collected money to the intended bodies has been widely reported (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker – STPT, and New Features Multimedia, 2025).

Transportation and checkpoints

Conditions are ripe for RSF-aligned traders to prosper by scaling up their activities since they face fewer risks of conflict and insecurity, particularly when transporting their goods. And transportation is an important aspect of trade.

Transportation of large quantities of goods between major trading hubs such as Ed Debba, Ed Deain, Nyala, Zalingei and Al Geneina is still mostly in the hands of old truck owners and drivers. But when they carry goods for RSF-aligned traders there is a chance of preferential treatment. Transportation of goods between small markets within Darfur or of travellers is now almost entirely monopolised by individuals associated with the RSF (sometimes even soldiers using military vehicles).

The recent transportation of people leaving El Fasher for central Sudan has largely been done by individuals from the RSF using RSF-owned vehicles, or RSF-aligned individuals operating their own or stolen vehicles. This applies mostly to small vehicles moving between markets rather than large trucks, as an adaptation to conflict and because of road conditions. Stolen or looted vehicles from Khartoum and Gezira are now being used for transportation of commodities by RSF-aligned individuals. Petty traders and travellers prefer to use RSF vehicles to move between markets because the driver is better able to ensure their safety. Reportedly stolen vehicles in Zalingei are being taken off the road: new owners are not able to repair them because of a lack of spare parts and/or the technical expertise necessary to repair cars that do not usually operate in Darfur.

Checkpoints represent a big challenge for traders because the fees charged increase overall transportation costs. This applies to both the RSF- and SAF-controlled areas. In addition to the long-known checkpoints at important road crossings, new ones have sprung up to the extent that truckers may encounter checkpoints on their return journey that were not there before. This is also one reason why truck drivers are always looking for alternative routes to their main destination (SPARC, 2025). Another fact about the 'checkpoint economy' is that not all the revenue that is collected goes to the public treasury whether in RSF- or SAF-controlled areas; instead, this is one of the fastest ways for security personnel to enrich themselves.

The RSF trade embargo on commodities leaving Darfur and Kordofan, introduced in October 2024, has also pushed established traders out of business, and allowed RSF-aligned traders and truckers to gain more access to trade, especially long-distance and cross-border, particularly with South Sudan and Chad.

RSF control of telecommunications

With the destruction of telecommunications infrastructure in Khartoum, the RSF began to import Starlink sets through West Africa, South Sudan and Chad. The lack of a functioning mobile phone network inhibits access to money and the flow of market information, and thus the movement of commodities, e.g. identifying safe routes and market opportunities. This also impacts the safety of traders. The RSF has subsequently gained control of Starlink units across many parts of Sudan, particularly Kordofan and Darfur. The RSF resorted in the beginning to the confiscation of private Starlink sets from people they do not trust. This not only tightened control over the flow of sensitive security information, it also augments money-making opportunities for RSF supporters who make their Starlink services available to traders and others for a fee.

Ongoing looting and banditry in Darfur

Other features of the war economy in Darfur include the looting of traders' stores and commodities. Banditry and violence in cities such as Nyala and Zalingei and holding kidnapped traders hostage for ransom reappeared after the war began (Atar, 2025). This aspect of criminality had been common in Nyala during the Darfur conflict which began in 2003. Before that, the first ever reported bank robbery in Darfur took place in October 1998, targeting the Darfur branch of the Central Bank of Sudan, committed by a group of young men of Arab ethnicity related to Musa Hilal before he became leader of the BGF (*Janjaweed*).

At the onset of the current war, the SAF and the RSF exchanged accusations of looting several bank branches in Nyala. This was before the RSF finally gained control of the town. News about looting and banditry added to the general environment of insecurity, triggering most long-term established big traders in Darfur to leave, either to go to other safer towns in Sudan, or outside the country, leaving a significant vacuum in market capacity and normal trading activities.

Conclusion

The close alignment of the political power of the RSF and economic power of the Dagalo family's wide-ranging business interests fuels and finances the conflict in Darfur. Moreover, it motivates the RSF to further expand its political reach. The significant expansion of the Dagalo/RSF's commercial activities in the region in the last two years is creating a monopoly in key economic sectors to the exclusion of others. At the same time, war has created a culture of lawlessness and impunity and a disregard for private ownership and property.

Regular state institutions have ceased to operate properly all over Sudan, but even more so in Darfur. In the absence of the rule of law, market regulation and financial accountability, a shadow economy has flourished. This is being nurtured by the RSF as a way of favouring its constituencies and giving them preferential access to the market economy, at the same time buying their allegiance through their advancement. It has given rise to the emergence of a new class of traders closely aligned to the RSF.

As a result, many long-term established traders, well-known to local communities but unable to compete, are being pushed out of business or forced to engage in unequal and risky trading deals.

Recommendations

- In the current context of Darfur where the transport and distribution of physical relief goods is so challenging, **market-oriented humanitarian interventions are critical for both consumers and traders. Local traders, trusted by and rooted in their local communities, urgently need support** from market-oriented humanitarian interventions to help them adapt and remain solvent and competitive in the face of higher costs associated with the conflict and the higher risks of doing business.

- Due to the close alignment of political and economic power in Darfur, there is, however, an increased risk that market-oriented interventions could fuel the war economy. **International humanitarian actors must therefore work with local communities to understand trader profiles and to identify traders with strong and positive human values who are known and trusted by them, as the priority for support.** This can also be done by supporting established and long-standing trader associations also trusted by local communities.

- International humanitarian actors should beware that any significant (i.e. large-scale) market or economic interventions will attract the attention of the RSF. **Numerous small-scale interventions may also attract the attention of the RSF and fuel the war economy, but there is less risk that they will, so this is a preferable approach.**

- **International humanitarian actors can learn from the example set by local and national civil society actors, accepting that operations in Darfur in the current context inevitably entail a higher level of risk than in the past and adapting accordingly.** Risks can also be mitigated by international humanitarian actors being well informed about the political economy and tracking the impact of their interventions in order to minimise unintended and unwanted consequences.

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About SPARC

Climate change, armed conflict, environmental fragility and weak governance, and the impact these have on natural resource-based livelihoods, are among the key drivers of both crisis and poverty for communities in some of the world's most vulnerable and conflict-affected countries.

Supporting Pastoralism and Agriculture in Recurrent and Protracted Crises (SPARC) aims to generate evidence and address knowledge gaps to build the resilience of millions of pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and farmers in these communities in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

We strive to create impact by using research and evidence to develop knowledge that improves how the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), donors, non-governmental organisations, local and national governments, and civil society can empower these communities in the context of climate change.

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